For Plato, justice [dike], is a concept which is never adequately defined without first establishing what both a just soul [psyche] is, and what a just state [callipolis] is. These two spheres of justice, as opposed to an actual definition of justice, emerge toward the end of Book II., and constitute that central theme of the following eight books. By contrast, Book I concerns several definitions of justice, and in turn, the eristic method of Socrates questioning these definitions. This paper will examine the Socratic method in light of the proposed definitions of justice. In particular, careful attention will be paid to both Thrasymachus' argument, and in turn, Socrates argument(s) against Thrasymachus. Examined, will be the significance of Thrasymachus' refusal to continue in the discussion of Book I., and how this refusal has implications on the idea that there is "no resolution" to the problem of justice. 5 pgs. 5 f/c. 2b.
