The following questions are addressed in this paper: first, what is the status of the objects of truths, and that is, where does the notion of 'equality' in mathematics come from, if, that is, there is nothing in our sense data that resembles perfect equality (e.g. the principle of indiscernibility)? Secondly, how is one to define the relationship between these? Further aspects to consider, are problems related to 'universals', that status, for example of a 'proper name', or to use an example from Hume: where is the 'forest' qua 'forest' in the sense that all our senses give us are particulars, this rock, that tree, this bird, etc.? Such is the context of the four theses' in question, and these questions or problems will be born in mind throughout the duration of this paper, and in turn, fine-tuned within the context of the thesis' in question. 5 pgs. 5 f/c. 1b.
Pages: 5
Bibliography: 1 source(s) listed
Filename: 2681 Epistemology and Foundationalism.doc
